Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 20 | Issue 2

Article 6

3-1-2006

"God's Created Order," Gender Complementarity,
and the Federal Marriage Amendment
Linda C. McClain

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Linda C. McClain, "God's Created Order," Gender Complementarity, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 20 BYU J. Pub. L. 313 (2006).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol20/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

“God’s Created Order,” Gender Complementarity, and
the Federal Marriage Amendment
Linda C. McClain*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Declaration of Independence states that all men are created
equal and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,
including life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The very
foundational document of our nation assumes that our rights exist
within the context of God’s created order. The self-evident differences
and complementary design of men and women are part of that created
order. We were created as male and female, and for this reason a man
will leave his father and mother and be joined with his wife, and the
two shall become one in the mystical spiritual and physical union we
call “marriage.”
The self-evident biological fact that men and women are designed to
complement one another is the reason that for the entire history of
mankind, in all societies, at all times, and in all places marriage has
been a relationship between persons of the opposite sex.
-Marilyn Musgrave1

*Rivkin Radler Distinguished Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law; Visiting
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This article grew out of a presentation
made at the Symposium on a Federal Marriage Protection Amendment, held at J. Reuben Clark Law
School, Brigham Young University, on September 9, 2005. Thanks to Lynn Wardle for inviting me
to speak at that event, and thanks also to the participants for helpful comments. I appreciate the
professional work of my editor, Jacob Reynolds, and the other staff at the BYU Journal of Public
Law. Deane Law Library reference librarian Cindie Leigh and Hofstra Law student Krista
Smokowksi provided valuable help with research. I am also grateful for the support provided by a
summer research grant from Hofstra University School of Law.
1. Federal Marriage Amendment (The Musgrave Amendment): Hearing on H.R.J. Res. 56
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7 (2004)
(prepared statement of Rep. Marilyn Musgrave, Member, H. Comm. On the Judiciary speaking in
support of the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment) [hereinafter FMA Hearing] available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.52&filename=93656.pdf&
directory=/disk2/wais/data/108_house_hearings (last visited Feb. 6, 2006); see also Preserving
Marriage: A View from the States, Hearing before the S. Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. (2004), U.S.
Senate Judiciary Committee holds a Hearing on Same-Sex Marriage, Federal Document Clearing
House, June 22, 2004 (statement of Rep. Marilyn Musgrave) [hereinafter Preserving Marriage
Hearing] reprinted in 2004 WL 1413039.
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Why does marriage, in the United States, need the protection of an
amendment to the federal constitution? To answer that question for her
colleagues in the House of Representatives and the Senate,
Representative Marilyn Musgrave, a primary sponsor of the Federal
Marriage Amendment (FMA), made the above appeal to “God’s created
order,” and to the Declaration of Independence’s assumption of that
divine order.2 Musgrave further testified, before the Senate, that the FMA
was necessary to ward off activist judges who care neither about the
“millennia-old tradition” that marriage is between a man and a woman—
followed, up to now, by “every state in the union”—nor for the “text and
structure of the Constitution.”3
During the 108th Congress, the House of Representatives approved a
version of the FMA (sometimes called “The Musgrave Amendment”)
providing:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man
and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any State,
nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status
or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or
groups.4

A similar version of the FMA did not reach a vote in the Senate
before the 2004 election.5 Nonetheless, as the 109th Congress
commenced in 2005, legislators in the House and Senate reintroduced
proposals for a federal marriage protection amendment, and the FMA
remains under consideration.6
2.
3.
4.
5.

FMA Hearing, supra note 1, at 5, 7.
Preserving Marriage Hearing, supra note 1.
H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003).
Carl Hulse, Senators Block Initiative to Ban Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2004

at A1.
6. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced on January 24, 2005):
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the
union of a man and a woman.
Id. There is not just one form of the FMA, which only complicates the interpretive and federalism
issues raised by it. For example, by contrast to S.J. Res. 1, H.J. Res. 39, introduced in the House on
March 17, 2005, reads:
Section 1. Marriage in the United States shall consist only of a legal union of one man
and one woman.
Section 2. No court of the United States or of any State shall have jurisdiction to
determine whether this Constitution or the constitution of any State requires that the legal
incidents of marriage be conferred upon any union other than a legal union between one
man and one woman.
Section 3. No State shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, judicial
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Not all proponents of a federal marriage amendment make such an
explicit appeal as did Representative Musgrave to divine creation as a
ground for preserving “traditional marriage” as the union of one man and
one woman. Nonetheless, whether they appeal to divine design, religious
and cultural traditions, biology, procreation, differences in mothers’ and
fathers’ parenting styles, social science, or “common sense,” FMA
proponents do share a view that same-sex marriage threatens gender
complementarity. On this view, gender complementarity—the union of
the two opposite, and different, sexes—is fundamental to marriage, to
children’s healthy development, to a healthy society, and to the family
carrying out its critical function of transmitting values and sustaining
democracy.
In this article, I will examine and critically evaluate gender
complementarity as a justification for the FMA. My primary focus will
be upon how the argument has featured in Congressional hearings about
the FMA, both in supporting statements made by legislators and by
witnesses. Although claims about why marriage needs the protection of a
federal constitutional amendment to meet the supposed threat represented
by same-sex marriage often link together a variety of arguments
premised on complementarity, I will attempt to separate several strands
of the argument. They are: (1) opposite-sex marriage is part of the
created order; (2) procreation is the purpose of marriage and has a tight
nexus with optimal mother/father parenting; (3) marriage bridges the
“gender divide” by properly ordering heterosexual sexual desire and
procreation (a variation on the second argument); (4) marriage is “about
children,” not adult love; and (5) traditional marriage transmits values
crucial for democracy.
A puzzle about such appeals to traditional marriage motivated this
article. Can FMA supporters reconcile their stance about the imperative
of protecting the gender complementarity of traditional marriage with the
transformation of marriage brought about by family law reforms and
contemporary Equal Protection jurisprudence? Such jurisprudence bars
government from legislating about the roles of husbands and wives based
on archaic stereotypes and fixed notions about their capacities.
Corresponding family law reforms have repudiated the common law’s
model of marriage as one of gender hierarchy (in which husband and
wife have reciprocal, and complementary, rights and duties) in favor of a
model of marriage as an equal partnership (in which spouses have mutual
proceeding or any other State concerning a union between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage, or as having the legal incidents of marriage, under the laws of such
other State.
H.R.J. Res. 39, 109th Cong. (1st Sess.) (March 17, 2005).
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rights and duties, defined in gender-neutral terms). To what extent do
contemporary appeals to men’s and women’s different (created) natures,
their distinct genders, and how these translate into distinct styles in
interacting with children—both of which are claimed to be vital to
optimal childrearing—simply reject the last thirty years or so of legal
developments, which stress the need to avoid gender role stereotypes
about men’s and women’s proper roles and destinies? It appears that this
may be a case in which one person’s “archaic stereotypes” and “fixed
notions” of gender (for example, woman as having “special
responsibility’ as the center of home and family life; man as the proper
provider for, and head of, the family) might well be another’s vision of
core elements of “man/woman” marriage based on “real” or “inherent”
differences between the sexes.7
Of the many dramatic changes in family law over the last three
decades, the “elimination of official gender roles” may be, as family law
scholar Susan Frelich Appleton contends, “perhaps the most significant
and pervasive transformation” of family law.8 Nonetheless, FMA
supporters continually and uncritically appeal to gender complementarity
as a justification for preserving “traditional marriage” without addressing
marriage’s evolution and whether marriage’s definition should also
evolve in light of legal and societal reforms concerning the status of
being a husband or a wife.9
In Part II, I offer a representative sampling, rather than a complete
inventory, of how these arguments feature in Congressional hearings. To
flesh out the argument that marriage “bridges the gender divide,” I give
some attention to its elaboration in other venues by “pro-marriage”
conservatives to prevent the recognition of same-sex marriage and its
appearance in judicial opinions upholding state marriage laws against
challenges by same-sex couples.
In Part III, I offer a critical evaluation of these appeals to gender
complementarity. Given this symposium format, as well as the
voluminous literature on the same-sex marriage issue, I will not reiterate
the arguments I advance elsewhere in support of same-sex marriage.10

7. I take the formulation “man/woman marriage” from Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial
Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN J. FAM. L. 11 (2004). See also http://www.manwomanmarriage.
org (Stewart’s website); see also infra Part III (for discussion of the relevant constitutional
jurisprudence about the distinction between sex-role stereotyping and “real” or “inherent”
differences between the sexes).
8. Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex
Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 110 (2005).
9. Frelich reaches a similar conclusion. See id. at 116, 133-34.
10. For this argument, see LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING
CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 155-190 (2006).
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Rather, I try to engage the specific arguments made by FMA supporters,
focusing in particular on their notion of marriage as “bridging the gender
divide” and their appeal to preserving traditional marriage as the Framers
knew it so that it can continue to undergird democracy. I situate the
notion of “bridging the gender divide” within the broader context of
arguments about marriage’s role in ordering otherwise unruly
heterosexuality and, in particular, taming men.
I further contend that appeals to a millennia-old, unchanging
“tradition” about marriage as the union of the two sexes fail to attend to
legal reform and societal changes leading to marriage’s evolution away
from gender hierarchy and prescribed, complementary roles of husband
and wife within marriage to a model of equal rights and responsibilities.
For example, in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Mitt Romney, Governor of Massachusetts, asked: “Should we abandon
marriage as we know it, and as it’s been known by the framers of our
Constitution? Has America been wrong about marriage for 200-plus
years?”11 Whatever else the FMA may do, it will not, I will argue,
preserve marriage as the Framers knew it.
I will now turn to an examination and critical evaluation of appeals
to gender complementarity made in hearings about the FMA.
II. GENDER COMPLEMENTARITY AS THE BASIS FOR A FEDERAL
MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
A. Opposite-Sex Marriage Is Part of the Created Order
Some supporters of the FMA ground their argument in divine
creation. As noted above, Congresswoman Marilyn Musgrave, a primary
sponsor of the FMA in the House of Representatives, told her colleagues
in the House that: “The self-evident differences and complementary
design of men and women are part of th[e] created order.”12 She went on
to invoke the Book of Genesis as a key text on how “two shall become
one in the mystical, spiritual, physical union we call marriage.”13 She
then turned to biology, namely, “The self-evident biological fact that
men and women are designed to complement one another is the reason
that for the entire history of mankind, in all societies, at all times and in
all places marriage has been a relationship between persons of the

11. Preserving Marriage Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Mitt Romney, Gov. of Mass.)
(emphasis added).
12. FMA Hearing, supra note 1, at 5.
13. Id.
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opposite sex.”14 Musgrave offered this same complementarity argument
in her testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in a hearing on
the FMA.15
Marriage’s place in the created order also features in statements by
other lawmakers about the need for the FMA. For example, declaring
that he would not “stand idly by while the courts in Massachusetts
redefine marriage in Indiana,” Representative Pence (of Indiana) quoted
the Biblical verse, “If the foundations are destroyed, what can the
righteous do?” and urged his colleagues: “marriage is such a foundation
of our society. Marriage was ordained by God, established in the law. . . .
We must preserve and defend this foundation in our society.”16 In a
subsequent hearing, representative Kingston invoked the words of one of
his constituents, a civil rights leader, on the foundational role of marriage
as a “sacred building block of our society”:
Our country was formed by a group of people who were persecuted for
believing certain fundamental things. They looked at their [C]reator in
terms of the defining foundation for our families . . . and this
foundation included the marriage of a man and a woman. The
installation of marriage was wholly designed for the production,
reproduction, and propagation of the family.17

Kingston continued that marriage laws—defining marriage as between
one man and one woman—were “designed to be a blessing for children
and society,” noting also the biological complementarity between men
and women. Marriage, in contrast to systems of slavery and segregation,
fits in “perfect harmony with the laws of nature” due to its “design” to
help children by “keeping their mothers and fathers together.”18
The creation stories of Genesis featured in other appeals by
lawmakers and witnesses to explain the need for the FMA.
Representative Steve King (of Iowa) asserted: “[I]t is imperative that this
nation act . . . quickly because marriage itself is the building block for
this society, this civilization, and, in fact, for every civilization since the
beginning of time. The first marriage was Adam and Eve in the Garden
of Eden, ordained by God.”19
14. Id.
15. Preserving Marriage Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Rep. Musgrave).
16. 150 CONG. REC. H6580, H6587 (2004) (statement of Rep. Pence).
17. 150 CONG. REC. H7898, H7921 (2004) (statement of Rep. Kingston).
18. Id. at H7922.
19. Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. of the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 5 (2004) (statement of Rep. Steve King), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.52&filename=92830.pdf&
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In that same hearing, witness Vincent McCarthy, of the American
Center for Law and Justice, invoked Genesis 1:26-27, that God created
“man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and
female created he them,” as affirming:
[t]he observable fact that we humans are of two kinds: male and
female. Moreover, it is plain that these opposite sexes while unlike are,
nonetheless, meet for each other. The consortium of a man and a
woman, the proto-society, represents the creation of a bond unlike other
bonds. Within the society of marriage, a man and a woman commune,
conceive offspring, rear that offspring, and provide the stable blocks
from which larger societies may be created.20

An explicitly religious and Biblical vision of marriage’s place in the
created order also featured in testimony offered in Senate hearings about
the FMA. For example, witness Tony Perkins, president of the influential
conservative religious organization, the Family Research Council,
described marriage as “created and sanctioned by God Himself,” who
officiated at the first marriage between Adam and Eve in the Garden of
Eden.21 It is the intent of the Creator, he stated, that men and women are
meant for each other, to procreate, and live together. But Perkins also
appealed to social science and common sense. The former confirms “that
the married state is consonant with our nature and good for the individual
spouse,” as evidenced by studies consistently showing the greater
happiness, health, longevity, and prosperity of married persons. And
“common sense” supports maintaining (man-woman) marriage as a
“social norm.”22
B. Procreation (Producing Future Generations) Is the Purpose of
Marriage
A recurring argument in hearings over the FMA is that only a man
and a woman can procreate. This form of complementarity is the basic
directory=/disk2/wais/data/108_house_hearings (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
20. Id. at 23 (statement of Vincent P. McCarthy, President, American Center for Law and
Justice, Inc.).
21. Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What Are the National Implications of the
Massachusetts Goodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidation of Traditional Marriage Laws?
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights of the S.
Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. 205 (2004) (statement of Tony Perkins, President, Family Research
Council), [hereinafter Judicial Activism vs. Democracy Hearing], available at http://frweb
gateaccess.gpo.gov/cgibin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.128&filename=96924.pdf&directory=/d
isk3/wais/data/108_senate_hearings (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
22. Id.
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one of biological—and sexual/reproductive—difference. Senator Hatch
explained, in a Senate hearing:
[T]here is a very simple reason that the institution of male-female
marriage has been the norm in every society for over 5,000 years. . . .
Society does have an interest in future generations and the conjugal act
between men and women creates them. This . . . underlies laws that
promote and protect traditional marriage. Decoupling procreation from
marriage ignores the very purpose of marriage.23

In the House, Representative Musgrave similarly appealed to the
long history of marriage as a relationship “between persons of the
opposite sex,” and asserted that “the primary function of marriage has
always been to provide a legal context for procreation and child rearing
by fathers and mothers.”24
Often, the appeal to biology carries with it the argument that the
male-female parenting combination is the optimal one for children. For
example, in a hearing about whether DOMA would likely be struck
down, making a federal marriage amendment all the more necessary,
Senator Cornyn asserted that marriage is society’s “bedrock institution”
for a reason: “after all, as a matter of biology, only the union of a man
and a woman can produce children. And as a matter of common sense,
confirmed by social science, the union of mother and father is the
optimal, most stable foundation for the family and for raising children.”25
An assumption that optimal childrearing requires the complementary
capacities and skills of fathers and mothers also animates FMA
supporters. Mitt Romney, Governor of Massachusetts, warned against a
society “indifferent about having mothers and fathers,” and urged that
because children need a mother and a father—with the “contrasting
features of both genders”—the FMA would declare a proper “national
standard” for raising children.26 During the House’s consideration of the
FMA, Representative DeLay linked the unique reproductive capacity of
the union of a man and a woman to the complementarity capacities of
opposite sex parents. DeLay admitted, to a point, the parental capacity of
gay men and lesbians:

23. Preserving Marriage Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch); FMA
Hearing, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Rep. Musgrave).
24. FMA Hearing, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Rep. Musgrave).
25. Judicial Activism vs. Democracy Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of Sen. John
Cornyn).
26. Preserving Marriage Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Gov. Mitt Romney).
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Mary and Jane can be great mothers and there are many of them that
are great mothers. Peter and Paul can be great fathers. But Peter and
Paul cannot be a mother. And Mary and Jane cannot be a father. The
reason that one man and one woman is necessary to rear children is so
that they can receive the benefits that a man can give them and a
woman can give them. They can see the commitment between a man
and a woman, the trust that is committed between the two, the love.27

In the same proceeding, other legislators appealed to the need for the
complementary parenting styles of mother and father. Representative
Johnson (of Texas) asserted both that children need a father and a mother
“for healthy and proper development” and that “[m]en and women were
created to complement each other, and that is most obvious in successful
parenting.”28 Some legislators appealed to their own experience as to
why children need mothers and fathers. For example, after invoking his
own fathering experience, Representative Garrett (of New Jersey)
concluded: “The ideal situation for a child is to grow up with a mom and
dad in a loving, committed marriage. Mothers are better able to provide
certain lessons than fathers can, and fathers in turn can provide role
models in ways that moms simply cannot.”29
C. Marriage “Bridges the Gender Divide”
The tight and necessary link between procreation and parenting is
also, for some FMA supporters, part of the project of managing the sexes
and bridging the gender divide. Prominent figures in the marriage
movement appeal to this function of marriage. As Professor Katherine
Shaw Spaht, an author of Louisiana’s covenant marriage legislation,
testified: a “core common understanding of marriage” is that it “bridges
the differences in the sexes, a bridge that is essential to procreation.”
Marriage, thus, is a “societal method for managing heterosexual bonding
[and] the need a child has for his mother and his father.”30 Maggie
Gallagher, President of the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy,
similarly testified that marriage fosters child well-being—and protects
27. 150 CONG. REC. H7898, H7923 (statement of Rep. DeLay).
28. Id. at H7916 (statement of Rep. Johnson).
29. Id. at H7916 (statement of Rep. Garrett).
30. A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Preserve Traditional Marriage: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 133 (2004) [hereinafter A Proposed Constitutional Amendment Hearing] (statement of Katherine Shaw Spaht, Professor of Law, LSU Law
Center) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/sueftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.120&
filename=98156.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/108_senate_hearings (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).

322

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 20

women—by bridging the gender divide: “Marriage is about bringing two
different genders together so that children have mothers and fathers and
so that one gender, so that women, are not burdened by the social
disadvantages and the inequalities, the enormous social inequalities
created when widespread fatherlessness becomes the social norm.”31
That marriage bridges the gender divide is a central claim in the
recent report, The Future of Family Law: Law and the Marriage Crisis in
North America, (hereinafter referred to in the text as “the Report”), cosponsored by Gallagher’s Institute, the Institute for American Values,
and the Institute for the Study of Marriage, Law, and Culture.32 A
striking feature in the Report is the vision of marriage as agonistic:
marriage is “unique,” and not like other close personal relationships
between adults, because its main feature is “the attempt to bridge sex
difference and the struggle with the generative power of opposite-sex
unions.”33
The Report argues that contemporary conflicts over family law rest
on a deeper conflict between two competing visions of marriage: the
older model of conjugal marriage and the newer (and to the Report’s
authors, deeply troubling) model of marriage as merely a “close personal
relationship.” The committed, intimate relationships of same-sex couples
and opposite-sex couples, for example, may share certain “core relational
values,” like “intimacy, commitment, interdependence, mutual support
and communication.”34 But marriage involves “core dimensions of
conjugal life” that “a culture of pure relationships” fails to “bring into
focus”—namely:
fundamental facets of human life: the fact of sexual difference; the
enormous tide of heterosexual desire in human life; the massive
significance of male/female bonding and procreativity; the unique
social ecology of parenting, which offers children bonds with their
biological parents; and the rich genealogical nature of family ties and
the web of intergenerational supports for family members that they
provide.35

31. Judicial Activism vs. Democracy Hearing, supra note 21, at 27-28 (statement of Maggie
Gallagher).
32. THE COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE
CRISIS IN NORTH AMERICA (2005), available at http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/future_of_
family_law.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
33. Id. at 15.
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id. at 33.
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A very similar passage about the facets of conjugal life is quoted in
the concurring opinion by Judge Parrillo, in Lewis v. Harris, a 2-1
decision by the New Jersey Appellate Division, which affirmed a ruling
by the Superior Court that neither the due process nor the equal
protection provisions of New Jersey’s constitution compelled the State of
New Jersey to allow same-sex couples in the State to marry.36 Rejecting
the characterization (by Massachusett’s Supreme Judicial Court in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health) of commitment as the “sine
qua non” of marriage,37 Judge Parrillo warned—drawing on Daniel Cere
(principal investigator of the Report and author of the quoted passage)
and on Monte Stewart—that this “distillation of marriage down to its
pure ‘close personal relationship’ essence strips the social institution ‘of
any goal or end beyond the intrinsic emotional, psychological, or sexual
satisfaction which the relationship brings to the individuals involved’”38
Marriage, Parrillo concluded, manages the fact that “there are two
sexes.”39 Its purpose is “not to mandate procreation but to control or
ameliorate its consequences.”40 Thus, the “deep logic” of gender should
remain as a “necessary component of marriage.”41
Why do the sexes need to be managed? Marriage, the Report
contends, is a way of regulating otherwise unruly heterosexual desire—a
desire that otherwise causes “immense personal and social damage.”42
The Report asserts: “If law and culture choose to ‘do nothing’ about
sexual attraction between men and women, the passive, unregulated
heterosexual reality is multiple failed relationships and millions of
fatherless children,” because “the default position for men and women
attracted to the opposite sex, absent strong social norms, is too many
children born without fathers, too many men abandoning the mothers of
their children, and too many women left alone to care for their
36. 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. App. Div. 2005) (Parrillo, J., concurring). My colleague Joanna
Grossman and I wrote a column for FindLaw Writ critiquing Lewis v. Harris (available at
http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20050628_mcclain.html) (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
37. 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (2003).
38. Lewis, 875 A.2d at 276 (citing to Stewart, supra note 7, at 81 (quoting from Daniel Cere,
“The Conjugal Tradition in Post Modernity: The Closure of Public Discourse?” at 6 (2003)
(unpublished)).
39. Id. at 277.
40. Id. at 276. This argument about marriage ameliorating the consequences of procreation
appears in Stewart, supra note 7, at 47.
41. Lewis, 875 A.2d at 278. This language about the “deep logic” of gender and ameliorating
procreation’s consequences favorably quotes Cere’s account of how the traditional model of
marriage embraces the “fundamental facets” of “conjugal life.” Stewart, supra note 7, at 81-82
(citing to David Cere, The Conjugal Tradition in Postmodernity: The Closure of Public Discourse?,
Presentation at the Revisioning Marriage in Postmodern Culture Conference (Dec. 2003)
(unpublished)).
42. THE COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 32, at 12.
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offspring.”43 Marriage serves (to use a familiar idea) a channeling
function: “its very purpose lies in channeling the erotic and interpersonal
impulses between men and women in a particular erotic direction: one in
which men and women commit to each other and to the children that
their sexual unions commonly (and even at times unexpectedly)
produce.”44 On this view, “conjugal marriage is fundamentally childcentered”45 because it manages the consequences of sex. One of the more
memorable lines of the Report, set off in a special captioned box, asserts:
“the bedrooms of the nation still produce children.”46
How is marriage’s channeling function, then, threatened by
expanding marriage’s definition to include same-sex marriage? A
premise among FMA supporters is that this would fundamentally change
what marriage is “for” or “about.”47 Society cannot sustain “incompatible
conceptions” of marriage, with most states—and the federal
government—adhering to “the natural link of marriage to procreation
and mother-father parenting” and a few states defining marriage “as a
form of friendship.”48 This relates to another argument made by FMA
supporters: marriage is not about adult love, but about children.
D. Marriage Is About Children, Not Adult Love
A striking claim made more than once in Congressional hearings
about the FMA is that children, not adult love, are the purpose of
marriage. For example, in a Senate hearing, Professor Teresa Stanton
Collett urged that the FMA must “define marriage as the union of a man
and a woman because marriage is about the needs of children, not about
adult desires.”49 In another Senate hearing, Reverend Richardson
43. Id.
44. Id. On the channeling function, see Carl Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family
Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992).
45. THE COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 32, at 7, 13.
46. Id. at 33.
47. For example, Governor Mitt Romney testified that the redefinition of marriage by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d
941 (Mass. 2003), is “no minor change, or slight adjustment. It is a fundamental break with all of
our laws, experiences, and traditions.” Written Testimony of Governor Mitt Romney to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Preserving Traditional Marriage, A View from the States, (June 22, 2004),
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print_testimony.cfm?id=1234&wit_id=3608 (last visited
May 5, 2006).
48. Legal Threats to Traditional Marriage: Implications for Public Policy: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 108th
Cong. 6 (2004) [hereinafter Legal Threats to Traditional Marriages] (statement of Dwight Duncan,
Professor of Law, Southern New England School of Law), available at http://frwebgate:
access.gpo.gov/cgibin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.52&filename=93225.pdf&directory=/disk2/
wais/data/108_house_hearings (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
49. A Proposed Constitutional Amendment Hearing, supra note 30, at 34 (statement of
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testified: “Marriage is about children, not about love. . . . This discussion
about marriage is not about love. It is about the best arrangement for
raising children.”50 He acknowledged that, as a pastor in an African
American community, he was familiar with the fact that people are
raising children in non-traditional families in his community, but
continued: “That doesn’t change the fact that there is an ideal. There is a
dream that we have and should have for all children—and that is a mom
and dad for every child, black or white.”51 In the same hearing, Reverend
Daniel de Leon asserted: “The institution of marriage is designed for
children, not for adult love.”52 He elaborated by appealing to gender
complementarity in parenting: children need a mother and a father
because they are like “two poles,” very different and at times even
opposites, but both necessary for a balanced form of living.53 In a
subsequent hearing, Governor Mitt Romney similarly testified that
marriage is “principally for the nurturing and development of children,”
not “solely about adults”; children’s healthy development is best
furthered by exposure to “the contrasting features of both genders.”54
The premise of gender complementarity at the base of this argument
is apparent in the remarks made by Representative DeLay when he
opened up debate in the House over the FMA:
[M]arriage is . . . not a contract of mutual affection between consenting
adults. It is, instead, the architecture of family, the basic unit of
civilization, the natural means by which the human species creates,
protects and instills its values in its children . . . .
Individual men and women, with the innate qualities of their gender,
come together in shared sacrifice to raise children. They each make
their own unique contributions to the raising of boys and girls as male
and female models for their male and female children.55

How does same-sex marriage threaten the premise that marriage is
about children and shared sacrifice, not love? Obviously, parenting by
same-sex couples would threaten the complementarity of parenting
anchored by heterosexual marriage. But FMA supporters also worry that
Teresa Stanton Collett, Professor of Law, St. Thomas School of Law).
50. Judicial Activism vs. Democracy Hearing, supra note 21, at 11 (statement of Reverend
Richard W. Richardson).
51. Id. (statement of Reverend Richard W. Richardson).
52. Id. at 13-14 (statement of Reverend Daniel DeLeon).
53. Id. (statement of Reverend Daniel DeLeon).
54. Preserving Marriage Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Governor Mitt Romney).
55. 150 CONG. REC. H6581 (statement of Rep. DeLay).
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recognizing same-sex marriage would affect all marriages by sending a
message that marriage has no link at all to parenthood. For example,
Stanley Kurtz, of the Hoover Institution, invoked Scandinavia as a
cautionary tale of how recognizing same-sex marriage supposedly
contributes to separating marriage from parenthood, so that marriage has
“nothing to do with children.” In contrast to the idea that “marriage is the
cement that keeps parents together for the sake of the children,”56
marriage, in Scandinavia, has instead become a “pure celebration of the
love of two adults,” so that men and women become parents together—
but not spouses—a pattern he claims has become more pronounced due,
in part, to recognizing same-sex marriage.57 In Kurtz’s view, because
same-sex marriage separates “the idea of marriage from the idea of
parenthood,” it seems to be a “cause as well as a symptom of the decline
of Scandinavian marriage.” Far from sending a message that “marriage is
for everyone,” he contends, it encourages nonmarital births because it
“seems to be spreading the idea that no kind of family is preferable to
any other.”58
E. Traditional Marriage Plays a Mediating role in Transmitting Values
A recurring argument in support of the FMA is that government must
act to protect marriage because it is “the foundation of every civilization
in human history.”59 But FMA supporters also appeal more locally to the
role of traditional marriage in the United States in undergirding
democracy and transmitting values and virtues fundamental to being
good persons and good citizens. They warn that tampering with the
institution of marriage could upset this foundational role of the family.
In his testimony, Governor Romney spoke of the family unit as
underpinning “all successful societies,” the “single most powerful force
that preserves society across generations, through centuries.” As noted
above, he asked: “Should we abandon marriage as we know it, and as it’s
been known by the framers of our constitution? Has America been wrong
56. Legal Threats to Traditional Marriage, supra note 48, at 15 (statement of Stanley Kurtz,
Hoover Institute, Harvard University).
57. Id.
58. Id. For an empirical refutation of Kurtz’s arguments about Scandinavia, see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE AND DARREN R. SPEDALL, GAY MARRIAGE: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE
EVIDENCE, Chapter 5 (forthcoming 2006) (arguing that Kurtz treats gay marriage as the cause of
phenomena that were longstanding trends in Scandinavian society and also countering that, rather
than same-sex marriages and partnerships signaling “the triumph of a purely individualistic
hedonism,” partners “are giving up choices by promising mutual commitment, and an increasing
number of them are sacrificing their liberties to commit to families with children.”)
59. See, e.g., A Proposed Constitutional Amendment Hearing, supra note 30, at 10 (statement
of Sen. Wayne Allard).
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about marriage for 200-plus years?”60
After the 2004 election, with the convening of the 109th Congress,
Congress considered newly introduced versions of the FMA. Testifying
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of a constitutional
amendment, Professor Lynn Wardle described marriage as “the primary
mediating structure through which values are transmitted to society in
general and to the rising generations, in particular.”61 He urged
protection of marriage because courts are “dumping loads of ad hominem
pejorative rhetoric on the unique and millennia-old social institution of
conjugal marriage” and holding laws “irrational” that restrict marriage to
a man and a woman. As he has in other venues, Wardle also warned that
changing the “domestic habits” of Americans—by altering the structure
of marriage—could have a dramatic impact on the “superstructure” of
America’s constitution.62 In a surprising use of the history of antimiscegenation laws (given the more typical invocation of such laws to
argue for same-sex marriage), Wardle also linked the movement for
same-sex marriage to dangerous political movements that sought to
“capture marriage,” such as white supremacy and eugenics. Wardle
referred approvingly to Loving v. Virginia, which struck down Virginia’s
bar on interracial marriage, as repudiating “stains on marriage laws”
caused by “extraneous ideologies.”63
III. EVALUATION OF GENDER COMPLEMENTARITY ARGUMENTS MADE
IN SUPPORT OF THE FMA
A. The Appeal to the Created Order
Appealing to divine creation and, particularly, to the Bible as a
rationale for enshrining a definition of marriage in the U .S. constitution
blurs the line between church and state. A significant feature of the
litigation in Vermont and Massachusetts challenging the exclusion of
same-sex couples from the benefits, obligations, and protections of
60. Preserving Marriage Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Gov. Mitt Romney) (emphasis
added).
61. Less Faith in Judicial Credit: Are Federal and State Defense of Marriage Initiatives
Vulnerable to Judicial Activism?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Lynn D.
Wardle, Professor of Law, Brigham Young University), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=1454&wit_id=4136 (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
62. Id; see, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Bonds of Matrimony and the Bonds of Constitutional
Democracy, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 355-63, 375-77 (2003) (arguing that U.S. Constitution rests
on foundation of marriage-based families and changing Americans’ “domestic habits” would have
extreme consequences for constitutional government).
63. Wardle, supra note 61 (discussing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
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marriage has been the courts’ focus on marriage as a civil,64 that is, statecreated, secular institution and on what government’s interest in civil
marriage is. Arguments like those of Rep. Musgrave and Tony Perkins
simply reject this distinction. Indeed, some marriage defenders have been
outraged by the language in Goodridge about marriage as a statecreated—rather than divinely-created—institution.
As Senator Durbin observed in his remarks opposing the FMA, at
issue is not the religious “sanctity” of marriage, but the “legality” of
marriage.65 Otherwise, “if we are going to adopt the premise that the
religious values that, in [our] own faith, support the institution of
marriage should be enshrined in the constitution, then I think we are
moving into perilous territory.”66 Durbin pointed out, for example, that,
generally speaking, religious leaders, following the “dictates of the
Founding Fathers,” do not want Congress to legislate in ways that put the
government’s “imprimatur, . . . permission, and . . . approval” on their
religious belief. By contrast, when religious leaders want their beliefs
and values about marriage—for example, a religion’s prohibition of
divorce—enshrined in the Constitution, this blurs sanctity and legality
and the line between church and state.67 This blurring of the religious and
civil dimensions of marriage also permeated Congressional debates
leading to the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act.68 Undeniably,
religious convictions and ideals, like human dignity and equality, have
inspired citizens to seek political and constitutional reform. But in a
pluralistic constitutional democracy, citizens owe each other certain
duties of civility and mutual respect concerning the forms of argument
64. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (“Simply put,
the government creates civil marriage. In Massachusetts, civil marriage is, and since pre-Colonial
times has been, precisely what its name implies; a wholly secular institution.”).
65. Judicial Activism vs. Democracy Hearing, supra note 21, at 46 (statement of Sen.
Durbin).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. For example, in the legislative debate over DOMA, Senator Robert Byrd stated:
[T]housands of years of Judea-Christian teachings leave absolutely no doubt as to the
sanctity, purpose, and reason for the union of man and woman. One has only to turn to
the Old Testament and read the word of God to understand how eternal is the true
definition of marriage. . . . Woe betide that society . . . that fails to honor that heritage and
begins to blur that tradition which was laid down by the Creator in the beginning.
142 CONG. REC. S10109-10 (Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
Elsewhere, I argue that this and similar appeals to religious traditions about marriage illustrate how
legislators enacting DOMA failed to satisfy the duty of civility and public reason in political
justification (as explained in the political liberalism of John Rawls) by supporting their appeal to
theological beliefs by reference to public reasons and public values. See Linda C. McClain,
Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
1241, 1244-52 (1998). On the idea of public reason, see generally John Rawls, The Idea of Public
Reason Revisited, 64 CHI. L. REV. 756 (1997).
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they make. Thus, government’s interest in defining, regulating, and
supporting the institution of civil marriage must be explained in terms of
public reasons and political (or public) values that are accessible to other
citizens regardless of whether they share each other’s religious
convictions.69 The same concerns and limits should apply when
amending the constitution.
B. Linking Procreation to Childrearing Is the Purpose of Marriage
The treatment of the “procreation is the essence of marriage” and
“marriage is the optimal setting for child well-being” arguments by
Vermont’s and Massachusetts’s highest courts, in Baker v. Vermont and
in Goodridge, provide effective rebuttals of this line of argument.70 That
rebuttal runs along the following lines: Procreation is not a requirement
for marriage. Not all married couples can or choose to have children. The
state regulates their martial relationship and its dissolution despite the
absence of any asserted state interest in children; for government also has
an interest in the emotional and economic interdependency that arises
between adults within a marriage. During marriage, for example, spouses
owe each other a mutual duty of support, which includes economic (and
some emotional) elements.71 During divorce proceedings, courts make an
equitable distribution of marital property on the theory that marriage is
an economic partnership; they may also order spousal support under the
same theory.72 By the same token, assisted reproductive technology calls
into question the idea that it is only in the bedroom that children are
produced. Infertile heterosexual couples use this technology. Same-sex
couples also use it. And a number of states have taken measures to help
persons avail themselves of this technology. So too, adoption and
fostering children are avenues to parenting other than procreation, and
(although not uniformly, e.g., Florida) states have enabled gay men and
lesbians to serve as adoptive and foster parents.73 And both the Baker and

69. See McClain, supra note 68; AMY GUTMANN AND DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT 52-94 (1996) (explaining duty of reciprocity in a deliberative democracy).
70. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
71. Twila L. Perry, The “Essentials of Marriage”: Reconsidering the Duty of Support and
Services, 15 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1 (2003) (reviewing relevant law on duties to provide support
and services).
72. See generally, LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, LEE E. TEITELBAUM, AND JUNE CARBONE, FAMILY
LAW 387-500 (3d ed. 2005) (addressing the economic consequences of divorce).
73. See ABA SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, A WHITE PAPER; AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
REGARDING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS 13-14 (2004)
(reporting that “Florida is the only state that categorically prohibits lesbian and gay individuals from
adopting children,” and that Mississippi prohibits adoption by “gouples of the same gender,” second-
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Goodridge courts pointed to measures taken by their state legislatures
and judiciaries to facilitate parenting outside of the marital relationship.74
Such state courts also considered—and rejected—the claim that
same-sex marriage would hasten the disassociation between marriage
and parenting.75 Among the plaintiffs in each case were parents seeking
greater stability for their families.76 Similarly, opponents of the FMA
have more than once pointed out the reality that gay men and lesbians are
rearing children and excluding them from marriage hinders, rather than
furthers, government’s interest in protecting children.77 Of course, this
leads to the claim that optimal child rearing requires a mother and a
father with their complementary traits and styles.
I cannot, in this symposium article, air the entire debate over what
social science suggests on this issue of optimal childrearing.78 However,
both the Vermont and the Massachusetts courts rejected this optimal

parent adoption (in which the same-sex partner of a biological parent adopts the parent’s child) has
been allowed by statute or appellate court decision in nine states (plus the District of Columbia), and
by trial court judges in at least fifteen other states), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/
reports/WhitePaper.paper.pdf (last visited May 9l, 2006); Jane Schacter, Constructing Families in a
Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and Second-parent Adoptions, 75 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 933 (2000)
(reporting on states allowing second- parent adoption).
74. Baker, 744 A.2d at 881-872, 884-85; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962-64.
75. Baker, 744 A.2d at 881-82 (noting under inclusiveness of argument about barring samesex couples from marriage to further “link between procreation and childrearing,” since “to the
extent that the state’s purpose in licensing civil marriage was, and is, to legitimize children and
provide for their security, the statutes plainly exclude many same-sex couples who are no different
from opposite-sex couples with respect to these objectives”); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962 (“the
department has offered no evidence that forbidding marriage to people of the same sex will increase
the number of couples choosing to enter into opposite-sex marriages in order to have and raise
children.”).
76. Baker, 744A.2d at 867 (two of the plaintiff couples have children together); Goodridge,
798 N.E.2d at 949 (among the plaintiffs are couples rearing children; each plaintiff “attests a desire
to marry his or her partner in order to affirm publicly their commitment to each other and to secure
the legal protections and benefits afforded to married couples and their children.”)
77. See, e.g., An Examination of the Constitutional Amendment on Marriage: Hearing Before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, 109th Cong. (Oct. 20, 2005) (testimony of Christopher E. Harris,
Assistant Professor of Pediatrics, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine) (testifying as to support
by American Academy of Pediatrics for joint and second-parent adoption by gay and lesbian parents
and warning that the proposed amendment would threaten family security for the millions of
children being reared by gay and lesbian parents); Defense of Marriage Act, supra note 19
(statement of Rep. Tammy Baldwin) observing that “well over a million children” in U.S. are being
raised in “gay and lesbian families”—in “healthy, loving families by parents who could protect them
in additional ways could they secure [marital] obligations, . . .rights, . . . responsibilities, [and]
benefits.”)
78. Lynn Wardle’s article about the relevant social science on children reared in same-sex
families spurred a much-discussed article by Judith Stacey and Steven Biblarz, finding that Wardle
was correct that authors often overstate the case for finding “no difference” with children reared by
opposite-sex parents, but they found that these differences are salutary, not harmful. Compare Lynn
D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 ILL. L. REV. 833 with
Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 159 (2001).
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setting for childrearing argument as a rationale. Why? For one thing,
those states had taken affirmative measures to facilitate parenting by gay
men and lesbians. Notably, in 2002, after observing that “a considerable
body of professional literature provides evidence that children with
parents who are homosexual can have the same advantages and the same
expectations for health, adjustment, and development as can children
whose parents are heterosexual,” the American Academy of Pediatrics
stated its support for legislative and legal efforts to allow co-parent and
second parent adoption so children can have the “psychologic and legal
security that comes from having two willing, capable, and loving
parents.”79 One recent study by an adoption institute reached a similar
conclusion about the social science evidence, and urged that “laws and
policies that preclude adoption by gay and lesbian parents disadvantage
the tens of thousands of children mired in the foster care system who
need permanent, loving homes.”80 Second-parent adoptions “have been
granted in a steadily growing number of state and county jurisdictions.”81
This functional approach to family definition and to parenting
suggests that the best interest of children may be served by a broader
approach to legal protection of parents. Notably, California’s highest
court recently concluded that the state’s interest in child welfare was
furthered by recognizing a lesbian who was the former partner of the
biological mother of twins born during their relationship as a second,
“natural mother” of those children, over her objection, when the
alternative was to deprive the children of the support of two parents.82
Her gender was no bar to the court concluding that the state’s public
welfare purpose of ensuring adequate support for children was best
served by recognizing parental rights and responsibilities when a woman
had supported her partner’s artificial insemination, “received the
resulting twin children into her home and held them out as her own.”83
Supporters of the FMA reject this functional approach. FMA
supporters claim that marriage provides children with vital role models
of both genders and that children who lack the complementary male and

79. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex
Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 339 (2002), available at http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/content/
full/pediatrics%3b109/2/339 (visited May 9, 2006); for a conservative critique of this stance, see
James C. Dobson, Pediatricians vs. Children, WASH TIMES, Feb. 12, 2002, at A15.
80. EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, Expanding Resources for Children: Is
Adoption by Gays and Lesbians Part of the Answer for Boys and Girls Who Need Homes? 2 (March
2006), available at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/policy/2006_Expanding_Resources_for_
children.php (last visited May 3, 2006).
81. ABA SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, A WHITE PAPER, supra note 73, at 14.
82. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 671 (Cal. 2005).
83. Id. at 662.
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female role models fare poorer than marital children.84 The trend in
family law, however, is to a more inclusive, functional approach to who
may be a parent—a trend relating not just to gay men and lesbians, but
also to stepparents, and other persons who act in a parental capacity
toward a child.85 Movement within family law toward supporting not
only gay and lesbian parents but also single-parent adoption rests on the
premise that such developments further the best interests of children.86
Assertions about gendered styles of parenting are highly contestable.
For example, one claim is that mothers simply are more attuned to and
intuitive about children and their needs. However, in his study of
fathering, Family Man, Scott Coltrane found both that parents who
equally shared child care responsibilities focused on “the comparability
of their parenting skills and similarities in their relationships with their
children,” and also that as fathers became more active care givers, they
also became more intuitive and attuned to their children.87 Moreover,
parents who “equally shared most of the child care” commented that
their children “frequently addressed the mother ‘daddy’ or the father
‘mommy’ without realizing that they had done so.”88 To those who
believe gender complementarity is vital to parental modeling, this may
sound like a dangerous androgyny. But it also tends to support the gist
of other research finding that gender is less important in caring for
children than such factors as parental warmth, nurturance, closeness, and
investment of time.89
Given his call for a “national standard” concerning optimal
childrearing, it seems significant that Governor Romney in so doing, also
spoke of a possible “middle ground” that would recognize “the
inalienable rights of all of our citizens to make their own choices to join
84. One recent book comparing boys raised by single-mother and two-mother families and
boys raised in mother-father households challenges that presupposition. PEGGY DREXLER, RAISING
BOYS WITHOUT MEN: HOW MAVERICK MOMS ARE CREATING THE NEXT GENERATION OF
EXCEPTIONAL MEN (2005). Research psychologist Peggy Drexler finds that such boys are
emotionally healthy and happy and do not lack for male “role models” in their lives, even if there is
no father in the house. Id. at 60-94. She also finds that, in some indicators, such boys appear to be
better off than some boys raised in two-parent families. Id. at 124-127.
85. See HARRIS, TEITELBAUM, AND CARBONE, supra note 72, at 911-42 (noting move within
family law toward functional definition of parenthood through use of such categories as stepparent
and second-parent adoption, psychological parents, de facto parent, and parent by estoppel).
86. For examples of state high courts that have allowed second-parent adoption because it
furthers the best interests of children, see Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1003);
Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 634 (N.Y. 1995); Sharon S. v. Superior Ct., 73 P.3d 554 (Cal.
2003); Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
87. SCOTT COLTRANE, FAMILY MAN: FATHERHOOD, HOUSEWORK, AND GENDER EQUALITY
80-81, 116-20 (1997).
88. Id. at 81.
89. NANCY DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 44-47 (2000) (surveying research on impact of
fathers on child development).
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in partnerships or unions of some kind and to have relationships between
one another, perhaps even to raise children.”90 This reference to
“perhaps even to raise children” is remarkable, given his firm insistence
that marriage is the optimal setting for childrearing. How, on the terms of
FMA supporters, is marriage’s core purpose—fostering child wellbeing—secured if unmarried persons engaged in rearing children are
supported in any way by the state? His stance appears to be one of
favoring marriage (and restricting access to it by gay men and lesbians)
but tolerating—and even giving legal protections to—other family forms.
Does this stance stem from pragmatism—after all, the highest court in
his state noted that the courts and legislature in Massachusetts,
recognizing family diversity, had acted affirmatively to protect the
family in its various forms? Or perhaps in grouping same-sex couples
with various “nonconjugal” relationships, marriage supporters further the
distance between opposite-sex marriage and the intimate commitments of
same-sex couples.
In any case, the articulation by some FMA supporters of a legal
system of marriage plus some other forms of recognition for a range of
nonmarital relationships indicates a glimmering that family law should
move “beyond marriage” in the direction of greater equality among
families. For example, in her testimony, Teresa Stanton Collett asserted,
on the one hand, that “marriage is for children,” and thus the FMA was
necessary to ensure that marriage is only the union of a male and a
female. On the other hand, she asserted that the FMA should “leave it to
states” to “craft compassionate alternative legal arrangements for
unmarried people.” Indeed, she argued that other “compassionate legal
arrangements” should be deployed to “take care of the diversity of
human relationships we find throughout our great nation.” Within her
purview is not simply same-sex couples, but also nonconjugal
relationships, such as “two elderly widows” seeking to care for each
other, or older siblings. The common denominator, in her view, is
allowing people “to publicly register their willingness to care for each
other and receive various rights and obligations” (akin to the reciprocal
beneficiaries law in Hawaii).91

90. Preserving Marriage Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Gov. Mitt Romney).
91. A Proposed Constitutional Amendment Hearing, supra note 30, at 97098 (statement of
Teresa Stanton Collett). I find this particularly striking because it is so similar—even in its specific
examples—to the recent report by the Law Commission of Canada, BEYOND CONJUGALITY:
RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001). Yet it is this
report that is sharply criticized in the report, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW, see THE COUNCIL ON
FAMILY LAW, supra note 32, as an embodiment of “personal relationship” theory that would treat
marriage merely as another personal relationship.

334

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 20

C. Marriage “Bridges the Gender Divide”
The argument that marriage’s purpose is to bridge the gender divide
coins an intriguing phrase in service of a familiar theme in defense of
traditional marriage: marriage is society’s way of taming men. The
marriage movement often asserts that the father-child bond—and the
mother-father bond—are more fragile than the mother-child bond and it
is marriage that is the social glue that cements fathers to mothers and
children. Evolutionary biology is one support invoked for this picture:
there is a gap between men’s seemingly infinite reproductive capacity—
and relatively low investment of sperm—and their capacity actively to
invest in their offspring. This contrasts with women’s far more (no pun
intended) labor-intensive investment in a more limited number of
offspring. Men, without marriage, wander. They stray. Properly
channeled into marriage, masculinity takes socially productive forms. As
the marriage movement puts it, marriage “closes this gap between a
man’s sexual and fathering capacities.”92
To be sure, the Report, The Future of Family Law, appeals to the
“enormous tide of heterosexual desire” (not just men’s desire). But in the
end, this tide is harmful because of men’s—not women’s—
irresponsibility with respect to intimate commitment and to children and
women’s vulnerability due to pregnancy and motherhood. Notably,
Daniel Cere, principal investigator of the Report, has also written about
the decline of courtship. Some contemporary calls to renew courtship
stress the role of women as sexual gatekeepers who use their modesty to
channel the passions of their manly suitors into the socially productive
channel of marriage. Courtship, too, which “charts pathways to
marriage,”93 is a way of managing the two sexes: female sexual modesty
disciplines male ardor.94

92. THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, available at
http://www.marriagemovement.org. For an appeal to evolutionary biology on this point, see JAMES
Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM (2000). Theologian Don Browning speaks of a “male
problematic,” finding recognition of it all the way back in Aristotle and Aquinas, confirmed by
evolutionary biology. DON S. BROWNING ET AL., FROM CULTURE WARS TO COMMON GROUND 22
and 68-69 (2d ed. 2000).
93. Daniel Cere, Courtship Today: The View from Academia, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Mar.
22, 2001, at 53.
94. See, e.g., Amy A. Kass and Leon R. Kass, Proposing Courtship, 96 FIRST THINGS, Oct.
1999, at 32, available at http://www.firstthings.com. I discuss both the marriage movement and
contemporary calls to renew courtship in MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES, supra note 10, at 11754, 281-89. The Institute for American Values has sponsored key documents on both of these
topics. On the marriage movement, see The Marriage Movement: A Statement of Principles (2000)
(sponsored by the Institute for American Values, University of Chicago Religion, Culture, and
Family Project, and the Coalition for Marriage, Family, and Couples Education); HOOKING UP,
HANGING OUT, AND HOPING FOR MR. RIGHT: COLLEGE WOMEN ON DATING AND MATING TODAY
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Does “bridging the gender divide” suffice as a rationale for
amending the federal constitution to freeze the definition of marriage as
between one man and one woman? Surely not. As I have elaborated
elsewhere, “viewing marriage as a means of domesticating men has a
long history closely intertwined with sex inequality.”95 This history
should counsel skepticism about appeals to human nature or to sex
differences to justify policies about the proper ordering of the sexes.
True, the Supreme Court has spoken of “real” or “inherent” differences
between the sexes, and their differential reproductive capacities are one
such difference. But what follows from those differences? Even if
generalizations about paternal irresponsibility have some basis in fact,
there is also the risk that these portraits of his and her parenthood rest
more on stereotypes and on socialization about gender roles than on real
or inherent differences. They also may fail to reflect individual capacity.
Portraying men as fundamentally irresponsible unless they are controlled
through marriage insults their moral capacity. It also assigns women the
familiar role of gatekeepers: morally responsible for themselves and for
men in the areas of sexuality and family.
But even accepting, for purposes of argument, the gender divide
rationale for marriage, one could argue that same-sex marriage would
reinforce and preserve marriage’s institutional role in channeling, or
ordering, sexuality. The Report does not include among the
“fundamental facets of human life” the sexual desire of those persons
who swim outside of “the enormous tide of heterosexual desire in human
life.”96 However, William Eskridge, a prominent proponent of same-sex
marriage, has argued that one benefit of marriage for gay men would be
precisely its “civilizing effect” on men’s greater inclination than
women’s—whether rooted in biology or culture—toward promiscuity.97
In other words, on this view, it is the institution of marriage itself—rather
than women—that would exert the civilizing influence upon men toward
exclusive commitment. Moreover, one could argue that marriage
between two women—less inclined, on the gender ordering argument,
toward sexual infidelity and parental irresponsibility—would shore up
rather than undermine social stability. And given the reality that gay men
and lesbians in intimate relationships are rearing children, marriage, with
its symbolic freight of commitment, could reinforce – rather than sever –
the link between adult intimacy and shared parenting. FMA proponents
might counter that gay men and lesbians who use assisted reproductive
(2001).
95. MCCLAIN, supra note 10, at 136.
96. THE COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 32, at 8.
97. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 9-10 (1996).
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technology to have children deviate from the “conjugal” model of
marriage because they artificially sever the natural link between sex and
procreation. However, unless FMA supporters have a persuasive
explanation about why the many heterosexual married couples who enlist
such technology should be exempt from this naturalist argument, then it
is not clear why same-sex families so formed threaten the social order
more than do the families formed by heterosexual married couples using
such technology.
D. Marriage Is “About Children”; Not Adult Love
As a rationale for the federal marriage protection amendment, the
argument that marriage is not about adult love, but about children, sets
up an either/or view of the purposes of marriage that is simply wrong
with respect to historical and contemporary understandings of marriage.
By contrast to Rep. Delay’s contention that “marriage is . . . not a
contract of mutual affection between consenting adults,” historians of
marriage would counter that such an ideal of marriage dates back at least
to the eighteenth century Enlightenment and carries forward from there.
Nancy Cott concludes that precisely because “Americans were very
much committed to marriage founded on love,” some were critical of the
practice of arranged marriages among immigrants, which seemed to fall
short of this ideal of “the love match.”98 Among the different models of
marriage in the Western tradition, John Witte finds that the
“Enlightenment contractarian model” of marriage—that marriage’s
“essence” was not its religious significance nor its service to the
community and the commonwealth, but “the voluntary bargain struck
between two parties who wanted to come together into an intimate
association”—was “adumbrated in the eighteenth century, elaborated
theoretically in the nineteenth century, and implemented legally in the
twentieth century.”99 Even earlier models of marriage, rooted in
Catholicism and the various Protestant traditions, included a contractual
view of marriage as a consensual, voluntary association; by contrast to
the Enlightenment model, however, they anchored this in a thicker view
of the theological, social, and political significance of marriage.100
In her recent book, Marriage, A History, Stephanie Coontz similarly
traces the root of the ideal of the love-based marriage to the
98. See NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 150-51
(2000).
99. JOHN WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE
WESTERN TRADITION 10 (1997).
100. Id. at 2-12.
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Enlightenment era, and, like Witte, finds that the full implications of this
model took hold only later. Her thesis is that today’s marriage system—
with its tensions and crises—has its roots in the Enlightenment’s radical
idea that “love should be the central reason for marriage,” but that this
very ideal has “an inherent tendency to undermine the stability of
marriage as an institution.”101 For if marriage should be freely chosen,
and based on love, then how can society preserve the institution of
marriage if people are free to leave marriages that do not fulfill their
expectations of love?102 Most pertinent to the issue of how concerns over
gender complementarity shape support for the FMA, Coontz also
contends that one reason that the ideal of the love-based marriage proved
to harbor the potential to destabilize marriage is that the ideal seemed at
odds with gender hierarchy, inequality, and the constraints of fixed
gender roles within marriage.103
The paring down of marriage to being “about children,” not “about
love,” seems to fly in the face of “common sense” understandings of
marriage. If you ask a random sampling of people why they think people
marry, chances are many will say, “love,” companionship, or—as one
survey found—to be with one’s “soulmate.”104 To be sure, many might
add, “to raise a family.” Again, defining marriage solely as about
children lops off the aspect of marriage that concerns intimate
association and commitment between adults. Constitutional
jurisprudence about marriage recognizes goods of marriage distinct from
procreation and parenting. Constitutional liberty includes the right to
engage in sexual intimacy that does not aim at procreation and
parenthood.105
If marriage in the United States was truly “about children,” not love,
why would marriage laws permit people who did not plan to have
children to marry? Why would state and federal governments grant them
the public recognition—and the benefits, protections, and obligations—
of marriage? To be sure, from time to time, persons concerned to shore
up the family have proposed a two-tier system of marriage, within which
the state has far less interest in—and regulates far more loosely—

101. STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY, OR HOW
LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 4-5 (2005).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 175-95.
104. The National Marriage Project reported this finding in one of its annual reports. See THE
NATIONAL MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, available at
http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/SOOU/SOOU2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2003).
105. On the non-procreative goods of marriage, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). On non-procreative sexual intimacy, see Einstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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childless marriages than child-centered marriages.106 But at present the
law still treats marriage (whether there are children or not) as having
significant public and private dimensions. Whatever else it may become,
at the outset, marriage is a unique public affirmation of commitment
between adults.
To enact the FMA to establish this “it’s about children, not adult
love” vision of marriage would reflect a sadly truncated view of the
goods of marriage. After all, even the story of Adam and Eve, invoked
by FMA supporters, traces the origin of this first pairing of a man and a
woman to God’s declaration that it was not good for the man to be alone.
To be sure, the Book of Genesis also contains another creation story, in
which God creates man in his own image (“male and female he created
them”), blesses them, and tells them, “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill
the earth and subdue it.”107 However, while procreation has been an
important purpose (or good) of marriage in the various religious models
of marriage in Western tradition, mutual love and friendship have also
been central goods.108 Thus, the stark either/or of the not about
love/about children claim runs counter to these religious understandings
of marriage.
Finally, the argument that marriage is not about love, but about
children, implies a critique of current marriage practices that seems ill
served by the FMA. Consider, for example, the argument that in
marriage, as Rep. DeLay puts it, men and women, “with the innate
qualities of their gender,” should join together in “shared sacrifice to
raise children.” Measured against this sacrificial model of marriage,
marriage is threatened by any view of it that would allow persons to exit
marriage simply because it fails to live up to the ideal of marriage based
on mutual love and personal happiness. It is far from obvious that the
problem is solved by barring marriage by persons of the same sex.
DeLay touches on a shift in cultural understandings about the proper
model of marriage. As theologian Don Browning concludes, based on a
survey of American attitudes of marriage, the minority view is that “love
106. See generally MARY ANN MASON, THE EQUALITY TRAP (1988) (proposing a distinction
between marriages with children, which should be more binding, and childless marriages, which
should be relationships governed by contract). Mary Ann Glendon has observed that “[O]ur
individual rights-laden public language makes it surprisingly difficult to take account of the obvious
fact that the public has a much greater interest in the conditions under which children are being
raised than in the ways that adults generally choose to arrange their lives.” By contrast, European
laws and policies draw a “useful distinction” between households engaged in child rearing and
“other types of living arrangements.” MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 125 (1991).
107. The story of Adam and Eve is in Genesis 2:20-23; the other creation story, with the
directive to be fruitful and multiply, is in Genesis 1:27-28 (THE NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED BIBLE
(1973)).
108. See generally WITTE, supra note 99.

313]

GOD’S CREATED ORDER

339

as self-sacrifice is key” to marriage, and the emerging majority view is
that marital love is a matter of “equal regard and mutuality.”109 If this is
so, then the FMA seems an ill-fitting remedy, for how will barring samesex couples from marrying restore this sacrificial understanding of
marriage? And is a constitutional amendment an appropriate vehicle by
which to enshrine one conception of appropriate marital attitudes over
another? Here, same-sex marriage serves as an emblem for a broader set
of social changes that seem to threaten marriage. On this view, it would
seem that better protection of marriage might come from an amendment
to require premarital education to encourage taking marriage seriously
and to abolish “no fault” divorce, or at least to put stringent restrictions
on divorce, if there are children of the marriage.
E. Traditional Marriage Mediates Values
To insist that marriage requires constitutional protection against
definitional change because it cannot otherwise play its historical role in
mediating values seems to overlook the significant transformation of
marriage as the Framers knew it to marriage today. To return to
Governor Romney’s invocation of preserving marriage as the Framers
knew it: how did the Framers know marriage? They knew it as a
metaphor for democratic self-government, in which the husband’s role as
sovereign within the domain of the home not only contributed to his
capacity for citizenship but also modeled democratic self-government
premised on consent.110 As I have written elsewhere, and as historians of
marriage amply document, marriage was a hierarchical relationship in
which women lacked capacity because their legal personhood, under the
doctrine of coverture, was suspended.111 Consider this puzzle about the
civic role of families: even as married women were denied personal selfgovernment within marriage and equal citizenship within the polity, they
were thought to meet their civic obligations—and to foster civic virtue—
by serving their husbands and children.112
Today’s model of marriage as an equal partnership reflects the
repudiation of gender hierarchy as a core feature of marriage. Has society
109. Don S. Browning, What Kind of Love? The Equal Regard Marriage and Children, 4
AMERICAN EXPERIMENT QUARTERLY 47, 49-51 (Summer 2001) available at http://www.
americanexperiment.org/publications/AEQ.php (last visited May 9, 2006).
110. See COTT, supra note 98, at 9-23; HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA 101
(2000).
111. MCCLAIN, supra note 10, at 56-60; COTT, supra note 98, at 9-23; LINDA KERBER, NO
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 8-15 (1998).
112. On this idea of “republican motherhood,” see LINDA KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC
(1980).
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retained marriage as the Framers knew it? To be sure, in all states but
one, civil marriage is still reserved to the union of a man and a woman,
as was marriage at the time of the Founding. But the Founders, one
suspects, might well conclude that contemporary family law—and
society—have abandoned marriage “as it’s been known by the framers of
our constitution.” The 18th century political and legal regime in which the
husband was sovereign in the home and the political representative of the
family scarcely resembles the 21st century model of marriage as an equal
partnership between husband and wife, whose reciprocal marital rights
and duties are framed in gender neutral terms. Since 1920, when (upon
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment) women gained the right to vote,
husbands are no longer the political representatives of the household.
Unfamiliar to the Framers also would be contemporary understandings of
the constitutional liberty of spouses to engage in nonprocreative sexual
intimacy and of a wife’s right to make decisions about pregnancy
without notice to or the consent of her husband. Novel also would be
family law’s repudiation of the common law exemption for marital rape
and of other doctrines giving husbands dominion over their wives’
persons.
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has taken a more skeptical look
at clams that differences between the sexes justify sex-based
classifications that assign different legal rights and responsibilities to
husbands and wives.113 What might have been an earlier era’s
conventional and even settled understandings of proper gender roles in
the family and in other domains of society now seemed, to the Court, to
reflect, “old notions” and outdated and “archaic” stereotypes about
men’s and women’s capacities, roles, and destinies.114 The Court has
noted the role that sex-based classifications have played in denying
women equal opportunity, perpetuating inferiority, and reinforcing
stereotypes.115 Consider, for example, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
observation, in a decision upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act,
113. On the impact of sex-based classifications, see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996). The Court has struck down sex-based classifications specifically relating to family rights
and responsibilities. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
114. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding as unconstitutional Alabama’s
alimony statute providing that husbands, not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce
because the law “carries with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes”). In Orr, the court invoked
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975), as settling that “‘the old notion’ that ‘generally it is the
man’s primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,’ can no longer justify a statute that
discriminates on the basis of gender.” Stanton made the oft-quoted observation that: “No longer is
the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the
marketplace and the world of ideas.” Id. at 14-15.
115. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996).
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that mutually reinforcing stereotypes about men as primarily responsible
for paid work and women, caring for the home, have harmed men and
women in the workplace trying to balance demands of home and
family.116 At the same time, the Court has also insisted that there are
“real” or “inherent” differences between the sexes, which are cause for
“celebration,” not denigration.117
How might this constitutional framework instantiating sex equality
as a relevant limit to state regulation of the family, but also recognizing
“real” differences, bear on the issue of government’s interest in
protecting marriage? For example, in light of family law’s move to
gender neutrality in assigning rights and duties within marriage, is the
gendered definition of marriage justifiable as reflecting “real” or
“inherent” differences between the sexes? Can the state offer an
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for defining marriage by using a
sex-based classification?118 Do “real differences” between the sexes
justify excluding two men or two women from marriage? Is there an
important relationship between this sex-based classification and the ends
that government seeks to further in recognizing and regulating civil
marriage? Or, as some proponents of same-sex marriage contend, is the
different-sex eligibility rule “anachronistic,” a vestige of an earlier
family law regime and a view of marriage as a “gendered status” that has
“been long rejected by both courts and the legislature”?119
Given that modern family law does not make procreation a
requirement of civil marriage and defines marriage in terms of an
exclusive commitment and of an emotionally and economically
interdependent partnership, there is much to commend the view that the
different-sex eligibility rule is an anachronism. To argue that the
gendered definition of marriage is not justifiable is not to insist that there
are no “real” or “inherent” differences between women and men.120
Rather, the constitutional issue is whether those differences bear such a
substantial relationship to the purposes of civil marriage as to justify
limiting marriage to the union of one man and one woman.
This question of “real differences” has occurred to me as I have
116. Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
117. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
118. Id.
119. For this argument, see e.g., Brief of the Professors of the History of Marriage, Families,
and the Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, in Lewis v. Harris, Docket No.
58389 (on appeal to the Supreme Court of New Jersey) (brief on file with author). I was a signatory
to this brief.
120. Cf. Stewart, supra note 7, at 91-93 (critiquing the “core legal conclusion of radical social
constructionism” that “there are no essential or inherent differences between men and women that
can rationally matter in law-making” and contrasting the recognition by the Supreme Court, in VMI,
518 U.S. at 533-34, of “real” or “inherent” differences).
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listened to arguments made by social conservatives about the risks
society will run if it replaces the “old institution” of “man/woman
marriage” with the “new institution” of “genderless marriage”—marriage
redefined to include same-sex couples.121 For example, Monte Stewart,
President of the Marriage Law Foundation and a participant in this
symposium, has articulated the social goods linked to “man/woman”
marriage and the high price tag that would accompany genderless
marriage.122 What stance would he and similarly minded marriage
defenders take toward the move within American constitutional law and
family law toward, as it were, “genderless marriage”? Indeed, would the
marriages of men and women who aim for an egalitarian approach to the
division of roles and responsibilities be “genderless,” on such terms, and,
as a consequence, be viewed by opponents of same-sex marriage and
supporters of the FMA as failing to provide spouses, children, and
society with the unique personal and social goods of “man/woman
marriage”? To what extent do marriages need to be premised on
fundamental differences in male and female capacities and sharp
differentiation in roles and responsibilities to (here quoting Daniel Cere,
as quoted by Stewart) “bridge the male-female divide” and in so doing,
foster social goods?123 And does this offer any sort of persuasive case for
barring marriage between two men or two women?
Appeals to preserving “traditional” marriage fail to account for
significant change over the course of marriage’s history. Given the many
and significant changes in society’s understandings of marriage and in
marriage’s legal complexion, critical reflection is in order when one
appeals to “tradition” as an argument for the FMA.124 My own view,

121. In particular, this question was sparked by listening to a presentation by Monte Neil
Stewart on a panel on same-sex marriage at the 12th World Conference of the International Society
of Family Law, held in Salt Lake City, Utah, July 19-23, 2005. Monte Neil Stewart, Presentation at
the 12th World Conference of the International Society of Family Law (Jul. 19-23, 2005). But the
theme of marriage bridging the “gender divide” also features prominently in the recent report, THE
FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW. See THE COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 32.
122. Stewart, supra note 7, at 75-85, 86-95.
123. Monte Neil Stewart & William C. Duncan, Marriage and the Betrayal of Perez and
Loving, 2005 BYU L. REV. 555, 564 (2005) (quoting Daniel Cere, War of the Ring, DIVORCING
MARRIAGE: UNVEILING THE DANGERS IN CANADA’S NEW SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 9, 11, 14 (Daniel
Cere & Douglas Farrow eds., 2004)).
124. The treatment of interracial marriage bans, by some FMA supporters, as a sort of
attempted capture of marriage tradition is most curious in view of the fact that such bans have quite a
long history. That history even predates the United States. Maryland adopted such a ban in 1661,
Virginia, in 1691. See RACHAEL MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY 19-20 (2001). And, as is well
known, defenders of such laws appealed to biblical injunctions against mixing the races. Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting trial court judge’s comment that “Almighty God created the
races white, black, yellow, malay, and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for
the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.”). No doubt, supporters of such

313]

GOD’S CREATED ORDER

343

elaborated elsewhere, is that critical reflection on families, their goods,
functions, and the relevant political values at stake, counsels opening up
marriage to same-sex couples and developing a registration system to
support various forms of committed relationships.125
IV. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have set forth several forms of gender
complementarity arguments advanced by supporters of a federal
marriage amendment during hearings about the amendment. I have
contended that none of those arguments, whether rooted in marriage’s
place in the divinely created order, in marriage’s role in tightly linking
sexuality to procreation or in bridging the “gender divide,” in uniting the
sexes not in love but in sacrifice for children, or in transmitting values,
offers a persuasive justification for such an amendment. The call to
amend the federal constitution to preserve traditional marriage as the
Founding Fathers or the Framers of the Constitution knew it seems, at
first hearing, a powerful rallying cry. However, a close examination of
the institution of marriage reveals that marriage has been, and continues
to be, an evolving institution. Whatever else an FMA would do, it would
not preserve marriage as the Framers and Founders knew it, for the
gender complementarity of that era rested on a gender hierarchy long
since repudiated in contemporary family law and constitutional
jurisprudence. It would preserve one aspect of marriage that is
continuous with marriage as the Framers knew it—the different-sex
eligibility rule. Does preserving that aspect of marriage, when so much
of the gender complementarity of traditional marriage has yielded to a
model of gender neutrality and equal partnership, truly warrant the
extraordinary step of amending the federal constitution to define
marriage? I have argued it does not.

laws believed this ban on mixing went to the very essence of marriage. It is striking that, in this
context, Wardle and others seem to salute the Supreme Court for striking down a very longstanding
“tradition” about marriage. Stewart and Duncan, supra note 123; Wardle, Federal Constitutional
Protection for Marriage: Why and How, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 439, 474 (2006) (the “Lessons from
Loving” section). To be sure, the appeal to antimiscegenation laws raises the question of what counts
as a “tradition” about marriage. Wardle and Stewart deny antimiscegenation laws were part of
marriage “tradition” because they focus not on the earliest, pre-Civil War laws, but on the place of
antimiscegenation laws in the White Supremacy movement.
125. MCCLAIN, supra note 10.

